Debate on the Indo-US nuclear issue is slowly picking up if this Pioneer article is any indicator. Kanchan Gupta makes a marked departure from the grovelling likes of Rajaraman and Raja Mohan, specimens I had ranted about earlier.

Kanchan Gupta asks questions which urgently need to be asked and which popular newspapers have all but strangled.

But like all bold moves, this was also fraught with the possibility of unravelling before it could be taken to its logical conclusion. While it would be premature to write the obituary of the much-vaunted July 18 Indo-US nuclear deal, it would definitely be in order to point out that it has begun to meander.

It would also be in order to underscore the increasing unease among Indian scientists, including Atomic Energy Commission chairman Anil Kakodkar, who feel India could end up giving up too much for too little. What adds credibility to the fears being expressed by scientists is Mr Kakodkar’s criticism of the UPA Government’s handling of the deal that he helped flesh out on paper.

Much of the objections, both from strategic affairs experts and scientists, stem from two indisputable facts. First, the US Administration has been less than honest in keeping its part of the bargain and has been relentlessly shifting the goalpost. Second, the Prime Minister and the Government have been reluctant to take the nation into confidence on an issue that directly impinges on our sovereignty and security.

The July 18 agreement, which is more a statement of intent rather than a binding accord, is based on the principle of reciprocity. It envisages India taking several steps, including the all-important separation of its nuclear establishments into civilian and military facilities and placing the former under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Authority.

On its part, the Bush Administration was supposed to present a plan of action to the US Congress as a precursor to amendments to crucial non-proliferation laws, including one that specifically prohibits fuel and technology supplies to India. The US was also expected to pursue similar relaxations in the rules of the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers’ Group.

However, the principle of reciprocity has not been followed - either by India or the US. While the UPA Government has been more than eager to fulfil its obligations and has presented the Bush Administration with a tentative list of nuclear facilities that can be placed under international supervision, the latter has scoffed at it, saying unless the separation is “credibile, “transparent” and “defensible”, the question of taking the deal forward does not arise.

A second caveat, that negates both the letter and spirit of the July 18 agreement, is the US insisting that supervision and safeguards will have to be in perpetuity, thus severely curbing India’s ability to manoeuvre in future. No less worrisome is the implicit attempt to limit and roll back India’s fissile material production capability and thus force a cap on its strategic weapons. In effect, this adversely impacts the flexibility of maintaining a minimum credible deterrent that lies at the core of India’s nuclear doctrine.

The Prime Minister and his advisers are aware of the pitfalls of caving in before unacceptable American pressure that is mounting by the day. By merely reiterating, as the Government and its spinmasters have been busy doing, that it is a win-win deal and that carping critics need not be taken note of, has only raised further questions to which there have been no convincing answers.

Instead, the Prime Minister’s advisers have opted for the disingenuous route of putting out stories in media that do not reflect the entire truth. For instance, it is being cunningly claimed that the UPA Government is merely carrying forward a process initiated by the predecessor NDA regime; that the proposed separation of nuclear facilities is not hugely different from what the NDA Government was “negotiating” with the US.

More importantly, Kanchan Gupta tears apart the Raja Mohan and Rajaramanesque arguments.

Those who are flying the flag for the UPA regime’s craven approach have tirelessly pointed out that India does not need an ever-expanding arsenal of nuclear bombs or warheads; what it requires is an arsenal that is sufficient to meet its security requirements. This argument does not factor in the very real possibility of threat perceptions changing over a period of time. More importantly, it denies India the right to decide for itself, as a sovereign nation, the benchmark for a minimum credible deterrent. It rejects all notions of autonomy in responding to what Mr Jaswant Singh described on Tuesday as “contingent situations and changing threat scenarios”.

What has added to the mounting disquiet over the manner in which the US is trying to manipulate India’s foreign policy and national security interests to suit Washington’s worldview is the stunning reluctance of the UPA Government to come clean and take the people of India into confidence over an issue that will have a profound bearing on this country’s future.

I’m compelled to ask but one significant question: what is the carrot that the US has offered to the UPA worthies that makes them this recalcitrant on such a crucial issue?

A certain degree of secrecy is no doubt necessary to bring a deal of such magnitude to fruition. That does not, however, preclude a full disclosure on the extent to which the UPA Government is willing to go to please the Bush Administration and meet its standard of “credibility”.

For instance, if the Americans can be privy to the proposed separation plan, why can’t Indians be told of it? Why must the Government take refuge in subterfuge if it has nothing to hide? And, why is the Government reluctant to tell the Americans that the principle of reciprocity cannot be diluted? Or, for that matter, the constant shifting of the goalpost is unacceptable to India?

The symptom of this malaise lies in the incumbent leadership rather, the lack of it. The fantastic irony is the UPA government virtually bulldozed its way into power without being given the mandate in the first place. And so the cravenness continues:

The July 18 deal is not about the US granting favours to a client state or a banana republic. It was supposed to be a deal between two democracies - the world’s most powerful and the world’s most populous - but it has turned out to be quite different. That’s a pity.